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Abstract
Sim racing, a sub-genre of eSports, is an online
motorsports simulation where participants from around
the world use specialized hardware to compete virtually
in racing vehicles around a track. While most
competitors complete the races they start, some opt to
disconnect following a frustrating racing event. This is
considered a ”rage quit” in modern gamer slang. This
research aims to identify the social factors associated
with a rage quit through a binary logistic regression
model populated with a unique dataset from iRacing,
a major online sim racing platform, consisting of over
19,000 races over 4 racing seasons (12 months) in 2018,
300,000 individual race results, and 16,000 unique
drivers. The findings suggest that social factors of past
experience with competitors, racing with competitors in
one’s own region, and presence of other rage quitters all
influence a driver’s decision to rage quit.
1. Introduction
eSports have blossomed from humble beginnings
as a niche hobby. Its earliest recorded event in 1972
featured Stanford University students competing in a
game called Spacewar for a grand prize of a year
subscription to Rolling Stone magazine. It is now
an estimated $1 billion industry in 2019 [1] where
total prize pools reach $25.5 million for the 2018
DOTA 2 International Competition (more than double
the 2018 U.S. Open golf prize pool) [2]. Single
eSports events like China’s Battle of Balls Professional
League have attracted 13,000 in-person viewers and
5 million online viewers [3]. Arlington, Texas is
currently spending $10 million of taxpayer funds to
build a 100,000 square foot dedicated eSports arena [4].
The most popular Twitch stream, OverwatchLeague,
has 1.5 million subscribers and can attract live online
viewership exceeding 100,0001. While single-player
1twitchmetrics.net/c/137512364-overwatchleague
gaming can be an isolating activity, eSports is inherently
social, which involves a community of players and fans
that interact both on and off the ”field” of play [5, 6].
Many non-gaming activities are being gamified with
the end goal of increased participation and engagement.
At Northern Arizona University, undergraduate business
students participate in ”Pathways2” events consisting
of service work, guest speakers, and workshops.
They must complete a certain number of these events
to be admitted into the business program. The
tool they use to track participation, Suitable3, offers
students ”achievements” for meeting milestones similar
to what gamers experience on Xbox One, Playstation
4, and Steam. There is even a constantly updating
”leaderboard” for Pathways event completion.
Northern Arizona University wants its business
students to attend these Pathways events (a requirement
for enrollment in upper-division business courses) and
to not give up or quit their progress, thus their adoption
of the Suitable tool. Academics have published copious
research on quitting jobs [7, 8], quitting relationships
[9, 10], or quitting bad habits like smoking [11, 12], but
research on quitting games is limited.
In contrast to staying power (one’s ”ability to
maintain an activity or commitment despite fatigue
or difficulty”4) rage quitting is a newer term in
gamer vernacular (Google Trends analysis reveals
the term began to rise sharply in web searches in
20115). An official term definition is unavailable,
but Urban Dictionary defines it as: ”To stop playing
a game out of an anger towards an event that
transpired within the game”6. Edge [13] declares
that a rage quit ”occurs when a player becomes
frustrated with the current game state and decides
to intentionally abandon the game” and Przybylski
et al. [14] define it as ”the act of disconnecting
gaming equipment, sometimes violently” resulting from
2nau.edu/franke/pathways-professional-leadership/
3suitable.co/universities/
4merriam-webster.com/dictionary/staying%20power
5trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=allq=”rage%20quit”
6urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=ragequit
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”sudden, high-intensity negative emotional experiences
in response to feeling overwhelmed by competitors.”
It has a negative connotation and rage quitters are
discussed with disdain in online forums and discussion
boards. In Dota2, frequent rage quitters face
consequences of being placed in a lower priority game
queue [13]. Although the term is primarily used in
a context of video gaming, the concept has a wider
application including sports, board games, game shows,
and other gamified activities.
Rage quitting negatively impacts other participants’
experience, since especially in team-based competitions
it leaves teammates short-handed. It also negatively
impacts service providers, because rage quits stem from
frustration and anger and those participants are unlikely
to remain members of the service resulting in lost
subscription or advertising revenue.
One goal we have for Dota 2 is to have
as many people playing and enjoying the
game as possible. To do so, we suspected
we’d need to encourage behaviors that
have positive effects on the game and
community and discourage behaviors
that have the opposite effect- like causing
other players to play less or not at all
[15]. - Dota 2 Team
Understanding who rage quits and why they rage
quit has powerful ramifications for social network
creators, gaming service administrators, and any other
context in which tasks are gamified. If we can predict
who will rage quit or what causes people to rage quit,
then service providers can implement changes to retain
more participants.
This research looks at a host of variables and their
influence on a decision to rage quit, but emphasizes
the impact of social factors. eSports are competitive
by nature, just like in physical sports. Regardless if
the sport is with a team (e.g. soccer, baseball) or
an individual effort (e.g. singles tennis, boxing), the
presence of, and relationships with, teammates and
competitors play an important role in athletes’ decisions
while on the field of play. The arena of eSports provides
a similar environment.
The research presented in this paper aims to answer
the following questions: (1) What social factors impact
rage quitting? and (2) What non-social factors impact
rage quitting? It also sets a foundation for answering
two future research questions: (3) How can social
networks and game/gamified service providers reduce
rage quitting? and (4) Does game-level (micro) quitting
lead to service-level (macro) quitting?
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 describes our research context of sim racing
and iRacing in particular. Section 3 details the
theoretical background and justification for hypotheses.
Section 4 describes the data and data collection process.
Section 5 introduces the estimation model. Section
6 presents results of the analysis and discusses their
meaning. Section 7 concludes with implications of these
findings in gaming and other contexts.
2. Research context
eSports competition can be player vs. player (PvP),
first person shooter (FPS), real-time strategy (RTS),
or multiplayer online battle arena (MOBA)7. Within
the PvP type are sub-genres including fighting games,
sports games, and racing games. Racing games are
further classified as arcade racing marked by fantasy
locations, power-ups, unnatural physics, and a lower
learning curve and sim racing, which emphasizes
realistic physics, cars, and track locations. A mix
of the two is considered a sim-cade8. The following
subsections introduce sim racing and specifically the
iRacing platform to orient the reader in understanding
the dataset and its variables.
2.1. Sim racing
Sim racing involves a user manipulating specialized
hardware (steering wheels, pedals, shifters, and button
boxes) to control a virtual car around a virtual
track through simulator software running on a PC or
gaming console. The driver sees the race track from
the perspective of the vehicle’s cockpit on monitors,
screens, or through a virtual reality (VR) headset.
Advancements in hardware, processing power,
telemetry, and scanning methods have diminished the
gap between sim racing and real world racing. Motoring
media publisher TopGear brought Greger Huttu, a sim
racing world champion from Finland who does not
possess a driver’s license and had never driven a real
car, to Road Atlanta to race a 260bhp Star Mazda
open-wheeler race car and determine how well he could
translate his sim racing experience to the real world. The
coaches were impressed with his speed. “The telemetry
confirms it. His braking points are spot on. He’s firm
and precise on the throttle. And in the fastest corner, he’s
entering at 100mph compared to an experienced driver’s
110 - a sign of absolute confidence and natural feel for
grip.” [16]. Professional race car drivers including Dale
Earnhardt, Jr., Kyle Larson, and Joey Logano use sim
racing to train and learn new tracks9.
7discoveresports.com/what-are-the-game-types/
8n3rdabl3.com/2017/08/racing-sim-arcade-differences/
9iracing.com/testimonials/
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2.2. iRacing
iRacing (short for Internet Racing), is a
subscription-based sim racing platform developed
by iRacing.com Motorsport Simulations in Bedford,
MA and made available to the public in 2008. One of
its co-founders, John Henry, is also principal owner
of the Boston Red Sox and Liverpool Football Club.
iRacing aims to offer the most realistic and authentic
racing experience to its members. They use LIDAR
technology10 to laser scan real-world race tracks which
are accurate to one millimeter. For cars, iRacing
developers use telemetry data and “scan, weigh, and
measure each part of the actual race cars and assemble
them digitally, giving users a mathematically correct
vehicle to drive on the mathematically correct racing
surface” [17].
iRacing’s platform is unique, because unlike other
sim racing software (e.g. Assetto Corsa, Project Cars
2, Automobilista, rFactor 2), competition is online-only.
There is no single-player mode outside of practice
hotlapping and no AI cars to race against. All
competition is against other members of the iRacing
service, which has seen steady growth and now boasts
over 50,000 members, 50 official series, 400 private
leagues11, and a 2019 annual prize pool of $300,00012.
2.3. Pricing model
iRacing’s pricing model is subscription plus content.
Its members, referred to as iRacers, subscribe by
paying monthly or annual fees (ranging from $13 per
month to $199 per two years, though discounts are
frequently available) giving them access to iRacing’s
base content of 18 cars and 18 tracks. Additional
cars (50+) and tracks (60+) are available to license
at prices from $11.95 to $14.95 each with discounts
offered for purchasing multiple pieces of content in
one transaction or by having reached a threshold of
content purchased. iRacing has licensing partnerships
with numerous real-world racing organizations and race
car manufacturers and series (e.g. NASCAR, Renault,
Mazda, Porsche, Blancpain, and McLaren) which afford
them the rights to model and sell vehicle licenses to
iRacers.
2.4. Scoring
To promote safe, organized, and competitive races,
iRacing ranks each iRacer with two independent ratings:
(1) iRating and (2) safety rating. An iRacer could have a
10oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lidar.html
11iracing.com/overview/
12iracing.com/iracing-to-award-300000-in-2019/
very high safety rating with a low iRating or vice-versa.
Races occur in 4 main categories: Road, oval, dirt road
(also known as rallycross), and dirt oval. iRacers have
separate scores for iRating and safety rating in each
category, but most iRacers focus on one racing category.
2.4.1. iRating. iRating, based on the Elo system
used to rank chess players [18], is a measure of an
iRacer’s ability to win races and finish near the front of
the pack. Each race is a zero-sum game where iRacers
take a share of iRating from all drivers who finished
behind them and lose iRating to all drivers who finished
ahead of them. A driver who beats another driver with
an iRating higher than them will gain more iRating than
beating a driver with a lower iRating. All iRacers start
their career in each category at 1,350 iRating. Given the
zero-sum game of iRating, that number also serves as
the mean iRating. In 2018, the highest iRating of more
than 10,000 was held by Ty Majeski, a 22-year-old from
Wisconsin whose iRacing success earned him a position
as a development driver for Roush Fenway Racing [19].
2.4.2. Safety rating. Safety rating is a measure
of a driver’s ability to keep within the bounds of the
track, maintain control of the car, and avoid contact
with other cars. Each violation is considered an incident
with different types of violations resulting in differing
incident points. For example, having more than 50% of
one’s car off the track surface results in a 1x incident
while a hard collision with another vehicle results in a
4x incident. Incidents do not assign blame, so in the
case of a reckless driver who T-bones another car in
the braking zone, both iRacers would be assessed a 4x
incident. Most races have an incident limit (for example,
in most races lasting less than an hour, the incident limit
is 17x). Once an iRacer surpasses that limit, the driver
is immediately disqualified.
2.5. License levels
iRacing uses the number of corners driven per
incident received as the measure to determine a driver’s
safety rating. The iRacer sees their safety rating in
terms of license classes. All iRacers begin in the
rookie (R) license class and can progress through safe
driving to D, C, B, A, and Pro licenses. Each level
requires a progressively higher degree of safe racing
and affords the iRacer opportunities to race in more
challenging series. Similarly, license levels can be
lost through amassing high incidents per corner. Once
an iRacer crosses the threshold of a license level or
sublevel (either an increase or decrease), their safety
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rating also immediately increases/decreases by 0.4 to
minimize bouncing between levels. License levels are
identified by a license level and a sublicense level (from
zero to 4.99).
2.6. Violations and protests
iRacing has a protest system to minimize abuse of
the platform’s no-fault incident system. After races,
members can protest competitors for violation of the
iRacing Sporting Code, a 37-page document that all
members must agree to abide by when registering.
Violations include intentional wrecking, retaliation,
blocking (swerving on a straight to avoid being passed),
and abusive behavior or language in voice or text chat
during a session. iRacing staff review each protest
claim and can serve warnings or consequences including
feature restriction or suspension/loss of membership.
2.7. iRacing series
Within each of the four racing categories, iRacing
schedules dozens of official 12-week series. Each series
runs with a particular car (e.g. Formula Renault 2.0) or
class of car (e.g. GT3) for the entire season, changing
tracks weekly. Races run as frequently as hourly or
as infrequently as weekend only, depending on the
popularity of the series. All series have a minimum
license class required to participate. Rookie series all
use the base iRacing content included with subscriptions
and include lower-powered cars at less-challenging
tracks. The fastest cars and most challenging tracks are
limited to series which require higher license levels (C,
B, or A) For example, iRacers who want to compete in
the popular VRS GT3 Sprint series must first earn and
maintain a B license.
2.8. Race process
Once an iRacer registers for a race, they are required
to participate or else forfeit – the equivalent of having
finished last in the race. iRacing divides up the
registered drivers into splits based on (1) the number of
cars accommodated on the track’s starting grid and/or
pit lane and (2) the drivers’ iRatings. If 60 iRacers
register for a race on a track that accommodates 20 cars,
the 20 drivers with the highest iRatings will comprise
the top split, the 20 drivers with the lowest iRatings
will comprise the bottom split, and the 20 remaining
drivers will comprise the middle split. A brief practice
session ensues followed by the qualifying session where
drivers have a set number of minutes and/or laps to set
their single best lap time. The fastest qualifying time
among the drivers in the split will start the race on pole
position with each slower qualifying time on the grid
behind that driver. Drivers who do not qualify start on
the grid behind qualifiers, with their iRating determining
their grid position. Races last a set number of minutes or
laps, with penalties (black flags) automatically assessed
throughout the race for false starts, cutting corners,
speeding in the pit lane, etc. Such penalties would
require a driver to enter the pit lane for a stop-and-go
or stop-and-hold for a number of seconds. Drivers with
damaged vehicles may enter the pit lane for repairs. If
the vehicle is too damaged to drive to the pit lane, they
can request a “tow” to their pit stall which incurs a time
penalty before the repair ensues. After the race, iRacing
adjusts each driver’s iRating and safety rating according
to their performance on the track and strength of field
(average iRating of all iRacers in the split).
3. Theory and hypotheses
This section introduces the existing literature and
theories (concentrated in social network, turnover,
and organizational behavior theory) that justify three
hypotheses for this study.
3.1. Social network theory
Social network theory encourages us to view
participants as nodes with ties linking them with
others [20, 21]. Two individuals that share similar
characteristics or with a history of interactions would
form stronger ties. These ties are more important than
individual agency, an individual’s ability to influence
her/his own success. Figure 1 depicts a social network
where participant ”C” is in isolation, the strongest link
exists between participants ”A” and ”B”, and a weak link
exists between participants ”A” and ”D”.
Bridging social network theory with turnover
theory, Feeley and Barnett [22] posited that the more
communication employees have with employees that
quit are also more likely to leave their job and employees
on the ”periphery” (with few social ties) are at a greater
risk of turnover. In Figure 1, participant ”C” followed
by participant ”D” are most likely to quit and participant
”A” is least likely to quit. Organizational psychologists
refer to this as kinship responsibility [23, 24, 25].
3.2. Turnover and organizational behavior
theory
The decades-old body of scientific literature on
turnover seeks to determine how and why employees
quit jobs. Although quitting a job (considered macro
quit) differs from rage-quitting a competition/game (a
micro quit), these theories justify the hypotheses and this
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Figure 1. Social network nodes and links
research will explore if the factors of a macro quit still
apply in the context of a micro quit. Using Facebook
as an example in another context, a micro quit would
be a user ending their current session by closing their
browser, navigating to another web site, or closing the
app. A macro quit would be a user deleting their
account.
Anger and frustration also lead to employee turnover
[26, 27, 28] and job performance influences quitting [29,
30]. Porter et al. [31, 32] determined that organizational
commitment influences turnover. Quitting occurs in
clusters, referred to as a ”snowball effect” [33]. In
this regard, employees act in alignment with contagion
theory, or that opinions, ideas, and actions spread
through a network similar to a communicable disease
[34, 35].
3.3. Hypotheses
Assuming that frustrating gaming experiences lead
to rage quits similar to how frustration and anger lead
to employee turnover, organizational behavior theories
justify three hypotheses for this study. iRacing is a
paid service and commitment to this service can be
proxied by tenure of one’s membership similar to how
commitment to a job can be measured by length of
employment. In the same way that employees are
motivated to stay in their jobs to not let down their
family and friends, eSports competitors are motivated to
stay when surrounded by competitors with whom they
have social ties, justifying hypothesis 1: Drivers with
fewer competitors in his/her region are more likely
to rage quit and hypothesis 2: The less prior race
experience a driver has with his/her competitors, the
more likely they are to rage quit. Contagion theory
justifies hypothesis 3: If a driver rage quits, other
drivers in the race are more likely to rage quit.
4. Data and variables
This section describes the data collection process,
why this particular set of data is appropriate to test the
hypotheses, how calculated variables were determined,
defines the variables, and presents summary statistics.
4.1. Data collection process
A benefit to drivers on iRacing’s service is the
quantity of metrics they provide; from macro-level
trends to the incidents and times that make up an
individual lap in a race. The data from iRacing is
ideal for investigating rage quitting given the quantity
of variables available and the quantity of races that take
place.
iRacing’s data is available to users via active web
pages, but would be too time and labor intensive to
collect manually. An iRacer from Tasmania developed
a Python library13 that retrieves data from iRacing on
members, cars, tracks, series, race results, incidents, and
lap results. I used these libraries to scrape data from
iRacing and transform it into a format that populated
rows in several CSV files.
Microsoft Excel and Python were used to
add several ”calculated” variables (e.g. cusp of
promotion/demotion, rage quit, performance in
previous race, number of other drivers in same race
from the same region, number of previous races with
competitors, etc.). The final data set is completely
unique and no academic paper revealed in searches at
the time of this writing uses data from iRacing.
4.2. Data subset rationale
All data come from the four 12-week series in 2018
comprising the entire calendar year. In 2018, hundreds
of thousands of races occurred in all four disciplines
across all series in iRacing. Each series differs with
respect to license requirements, skill level, incident
limits, duration of races, and frequency of races. Data in
this analysis are limited to a single race series, the Skip
Barber Race Series. All races involve a single vehicle,
the Skip Barber Formula 200014, a 150-horsepower
13github.com/jeysonmc/ir webstats
14iracing.com/cars/skip-barber-formula-2000/
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4-cylinder open-wheeled race car capable of top speeds
reaching 135mph. This particular series was chosen for
a number of reasons.
(1) The series uses a mix of free tracks and paid
tracks. (2) The car is not included in iRacing’s free
content and must be purchased for $11.95, representing
a financial commitment of the drivers that race in this
series. (3) The series requires a D-level or better license,
but is popular among all driver levels. In D-level races,
drivers may ”fast repair” their car one time in a race
simply by stopping in their designated pit stall and
receive an instantaneous repair. Subsequent repairs can
take several minutes to repair in the pit stall depending
on the severity of the damage. This fast repair feature
does not exist in C and higher level race series. (4) Races
are consistent in duration - around 25 minutes per race.
(5) 99.44% of races ”went official,” meaning it had a
minimum of 6 drivers and race results impacted drivers’
iRatings and safety ratings. (6) Races occur hourly.
Many other series are less popular and are scheduled
every other hour or only on weekends.
4.3. Determination of rage quit
Rage quit is not a variable provided by iRacing and
must be determined with the data available. I construct
a dummy variable where 0 is not a rage quit and 1 is a
rage quit. Since a rage quit is a frustrating event that
leads to dropping out of the competition, I set the value
of our dummy variable to 1 if both of the following
are true: (1) the user accumulated a minimum of 2x
incident points and (2) quit the race within the first 5
laps. Incident points are tied to the safety rating of an
iRacer and accrue throughout the laps of a race. An
ideal data set would include Likert-scale variables on the
emotions and feelings of each participant during or after
the race, or a self-declared reason for why they quit.
This variable is our best proxy for a rage quit.
I acknowledge this determination could assign false
positives to a racer who amassed 2x incident points,
but disconnected because their internet connection failed
or they had to attend to a crying baby or barking dog.
False negatives are also a possibility, since a driver could
possibly rage quit with simply a 1x incident (just one
off-track, which is highly unlikely) or after 5 completed
laps (more likely, but some drivers quit early from
a race because a repair would take more time than
remaining in the race). While not perfect, the signs and
significance of parameter estimates remained unchanged
when varying the rage quit factors, giving us confidence
that this dummy variable is adequately measuring rage
quitting.
4.4. Determination of gender
Driver data is largely related to their race history
and performance, which are employed as variables in
our analysis. Demographic data is limited. Drivers
can post their photos and complete unstructured text
fields listing their hobbies, favorite cars, and favorite
films among others, but these fields are unstructured and
frequently written in the native language of the iRacer.
The driver’s tenure on the service and geographic region
are both captured. Gender is not explicitly available,
but I employed a technique using the Social Security
Administration’s 500 most popular boys and girls birth
names from 1980 to make a determination of gender
from the iRacer’s listed first name [36, 37, 38]. In a
separate analysis that includes gender as a covariate,
I limited the data to the USA, Canada, New Zealand,
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, which are
Anglophone countries where names would be similar
to those listed in the Social Security Administration
list. This analysis is separated due to the decreased
observations. This research assumes a binary gender
determination.
4.5. Variable definition
Table 1 lists variable identifiers in the model along
with their descriptions. The variables in the analysis
are a subset of the data available and collected through
the scraping process described earlier and chosen to
test the hypotheses and provide controls to the model.
The variables of interest (the social factors) begin with
the prefix SOC. Five variables with the subscript (n-1)
represent attributes from the iRacer’s previous race.
4.6. Summary statistics
After dropping unofficial races (0.56% of the race
results), the final data set comprises 16,622 unique
drivers competing in 19,105 races with 306,801 race
results. All records were complete with no missing
data. Each race had on average 16 iRacers. Drivers
averaged a participation of 18 Skip Barber races in 2018.
The minimum was shared by 2,952 drivers participating
in only one race and the maximum participation for
a single driver was 1,373 races. 7.97% of the race
results were coded as a rage quit given the determination
described earlier in section 4.3.
5. Estimation model
With the data collected and variables declared, I test
the hypotheses through an empirical estimation model.
This section defines the model, fits data to the model,
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Table 1. Variable definitions
Variable Definition
ragequit 0: driver did not rage quit, 1: driver
rage quit
socrq # of other drivers that rage quit
sochistory # previous races with opponents
socregion # drivers in the same race split from
the same region as the driver
splitof # splits at a given race start time
startpos Driver’s position on the starting
grid, based on qualifying time
carnum iRating ranking within the split
region A series of 36 regional dummies
irating iRating entering the race
license License level entering the race
tenure Years on iRacing service
prevstarts # previous road race starts the driver
has on iRacing entering the race
incidentavg Average incidents that the driver
has in all previous races entering the
race
fieldsize # drivers in the split
split Split number (1 = top split)
fieldstrength Average iRating of drivers in split
paidtrack 0: track is free content within
iRacing, 1: Track must be
purchased by driver to compete
cusppromotion 1: Driver enters race within 0.15 of
earning a license promotion
cuspdemotion 1: Driver enters race within 0.15 of
a license demotion
finpos(n-1) Finishing position in the prior race
irating
change(n-1)
+/- change in iRating from their
previous race
license
change(n-1)
+/- change in license rating from
their previous race
incidents(n-1) # incidents amassed by the driver in
their previous race (0: incident-free
clean race)
ragequit(n-1) 0: driver did not rage quit previous
race, 1: driver rage quit prev. race
analyzes tests of fit, and presents parameter estimates.
5.1. Logistic regression
Logistic regression is an appropriate model for
this study, since it models the probability of a binary
outcome - whether or not the participant in a race rage
quit. One advantage of using this method is that the
model is not affected by obtaining data retrospectively,
as in the case of this study. The outcome variable in this
model below is the probability that the driver rage quit.
Log(
pragequit=1
pragequit=0
) = β0 + β1socrq + β2sochistory +
β3socregion+ β4...Ncontrols
In the abbreviated depiction of the estimation model
above, the variables of interest are socrq, sochistory,
and socregion. controls represent the 55 other (19
control variables and 36 regional dummies) independent
variables in the model. The parameter estimates of
β1 through βN represent the relative change in the
probability of a rage quit for a unit change in an
explanatory variable. β0 is an intercept and the model
includes no error term; since it does not model the race
result, but a probability.
5.2. Data fit to model
SPSS imported the final data set in a single flat
table, built the estimation model, calculated parameter
estimates, and ran goodness of fit tests. Logistic
regression models do not produce a true R-squared
value. The Nagelkerke [39] pseudo R-squared value
is 0.097, suggesting that the variables in the model
explain 9.7% of the variance in the rage quit outcome.
An analysis of the correlation matrix revealed that
independent variables are indeed measuring unique
characteristics of the race results with the only pairwise
correlation above 0.7: fieldstrength and irating have a
pairwise correlation of 0.74.
5.3. Parameter estimates
Table 2 lists the parameter estimates along with
their significance and standard errors (region consists
of 36 dummy variables thus its exclusion from the
table). Positive and significant coefficients represent
variables that, in the model, will increase the probability
of a rage quit the larger the value. For example, I
interpret the parameter estimate for splitof to mean
that the more splits for a particular race, the odds of
a driver rage quitting are higher. Likewise, negative
and significant coefficients represent variables that will
decrease the probability of a rage quit the larger the
value. For example, I interpret the parameter estimate
for sochistory to mean that the more race history that a
driver has with his or her competitors, the less likely that
driver is to rage quit.
6. Results and discussion
The more competition within one’s home region, the
stronger the staying power for that driver.
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Table 2. Estimation results for regression model
Variable Coeff. Std. Err.
socrq -.240*** .005
sochistory -.005*** .000
socregion -.009* .005
splitof -.077*** .009
startpos -.020*** .002
carnum -.026*** .002
irating -.000*** .000
license -.066*** .003
tenure -.014*** .003
prevstarts -.000* .000
incidentavg -.023*** .006
fieldsize -.009** .004
split -.014 .011
fieldstrength -.000*** .000
paidtrack -.518*** .023
cusppromotion -1.309*** .414
cuspdemotion -.348*** .117
finpos(n-1) -.023*** .004
iratingchange(n-1) -.003*** .000
licensechange(n-1) -.151** .064
incidents(n-1) -.001 .003
ragequit(n-1) -.991*** .028
* = p <.1, ** = p <.05, *** = p <.01
Both voice and text chatting occurs between drivers
before, during, and after a race. In, say, races with
many Italians, the Italians will dominate the radio with
their banter. As expected, the more racers from a
driver’s region, the less likely the driver is to rage quit,
supporting hypothesis 1.
As expected, the more race history that a driver has
with his or her competitors, the less likely they are to
rage quit, supporting hypothesis 2. This could be due to
a greater race enjoyment being surrounded by familiar
names making it easier to endure frustrating race events.
Or the motivation could come from wanting to avoid
the embarrassment and shame of an early quit when
surrounded by more familiar peers.
Competitors’ rage quitting impact rage quitting,
suggesting that rage quitting occurs in clusters,
supporting hypothesis 3. An further explanation for this
could be a catastrophic crash in the first corner involving
many vehicles, leading to many drivers rage quitting
together.
Other non-social control variables in the model offer
some interesting findings as well. Drivers that start the
race further in the back of the starting grid are more
likely to rage quit. This can be attributed to mistakes
made in qualifying that lost them time, putting the driver
into a frustrated mood entering the race. Also, the
further back on the starting grid, the less skilled drivers
surround the driver, resulting in more crashes. Similarly,
the higher a driver’s relative rating to the other racers
(the car number), the more likely to rage quit. The more
incidents a driver has on average in their iRacing history,
the more likely he/she is to rage quit a race.
Rage quits occur more regularly in races with more
splits. In these races drivers race against more similarly
skilled opponents (e.g. a race with an iRating range of
1,400 to 1,600). An explanation for this is that drivers
with similar skill are more likely to have lap times close
to their opponents, resulting in closer racing and greater
opportunities for frustrating incidents leading to rage
quits.
As expected, the higher license level entering a race,
the less likely a driver is to rage quit. Since license
levels are based on corners per incident, accruing several
incidents in few corners and then quitting is a poor
strategy to advancing in the license classes.
Elements of previous race performance significantly
impacts rage quitting. A worse race finishing position,
loss in iRating, presence of indents, or rage quitting in
the previous race all increase the probability of a rage
quit. Change in license level from the previous race
is insignificant in the model. The expectancy theory
of motivation [40] posits that people are motivated by
how they expect to perform and their previous race is
the most recent outcome.
I expected that paid tracks would reduce the
likelihood of rage quitting since participants have a
financial investment in the track, but the data support
the opposite. It’s the free tracks that have less rage
quitting. An explanation for this paradox is that since all
drivers have access to free tracks, they likely have more
experience on them and can drive more mistake-free
than on the paid tracks.
I ran a separate model including gender as a
covariate, because the method for determining gender
cut the data set by two-thirds. The expectation was that
females would be more likely to rage quit than their
male counterparts, because females are a significant
minority in sim racing (0.9% of the sample data set) and
organizational behavior research finds that females are
more likely to quit if the sex makeup of an organization
is predominantly male [8]. The data support the
converse even though females have a higher incident
average per race than males, suggesting women possess
more control over frustration- and anger-inducing race
events.
iRacing’s license system avoids frequent jumping
between license levels by increasing/decreasing a
driver’s license level by 0.4 every time they cross a
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major license level threshold. A driver on the ”cusp”
of a promotion or demotion is aware of this entering a
race. The results were interesting in that being on the
cusp of a promotion makes a driver less likely to rage
quit, but being on the cusp of a demotion makes a driver
more likely to rage quit. Gray’s biophysiological theory
of personality [41] explains this outcome since the risks
of punitive actions is not as strong of a motivator as the
proposition of reward for good performance.
The model suggests the region of drivers influences
rage quit decisions. Regions with drivers that are more
likely to rage quit include America, Latin America, and
Italy. Some of the regions with drivers that are less
likely to rage quit include Iberia and France. Further
exploration on the cultural characteristics of these and
other regions could provide interesting insights.
7. Conclusion
This paper contributes an important finding to the
information systems, gaming, and human behavior
disciplines: Social ties do indeed bolster staying power
in eSports. Within iRacing, drivers that share the grid
with members of their own region or drivers they have
raced against in the past are less likely to rage quit. Also,
rage quitting has a social contagion ”snowball” effect.
This section lists some limitations of this study, suggests
applicability to other domains, and shares implications
for theory and practice.
7.1. Limitations
As mentioned in section 4.3, false-positives and
false-negatives are both possible with the determination
of rage quit used in this study. Sim racing as a hobby
requires a serious investment in hardware and software
and therefore comprises a different demographic than,
say gamers playing Fortnite (a popular free-to-play)
with a much lower hardware investment (a game console
or even a smartphone). This study explores rage quitting
in only one context. The results of testing hypothesis 4
will certainly differ in most other eSports contexts. In
sim racing, similarly skilled drivers in the same race
can result in closer racing and thus more contact. In
a FIFA soccer eSports tournament, the converse may
be true where similarly skilled opponents results in less
frustration. The (n-1) race performance variables only
considered the single prior race, but could be extended
to factor a greater history. This dataset does not observe
communication data (text and voice chat), which was
found to be a key determinant of premature quitting in
Dota 2 [15].
7.2. External validity, practical/theoretical
implications, and future research
To retain a large and satisfied user base, game service
providers can implement practical changes, including:
(1) place competitors from the same region or with
shared race history in the same split, (2) encourage
partitipants with a poor result in their prior competition
with strategy tips to avoid frustrating situations in
the future, and (3) offer more competitions with
free/included content. Consider with an advanced
model, rage quit predictions being made in real-time
and providing players at their most frustrating moments
with, say, a loot box to give an extra boost of
encouragement.
Testing these claims in other contexts is a logical
next step, although one would expect findings to be
similar given the theoretical foundations that form the
foundations of the hypotheses. If these phenomena
can also be observed in, say, a social network like
Facebook with over 1 billion accounts, motivation is
strong to consider how to create an environment that
enhances social ties to lengthen sessions and maximize
advertising revenue. A next theoretical step would be
to further explore the relationship between a micro quit
and a macro quit. Does a pattern of frustrating micro
rage-quit events lead to a macro quit decision? With that
knowledge, social network providers could predict and
prevent some users from completely abandoning their
services. It is my hope that I and my fellow information
systems researchers freely explore these questions to
advance our understanding of these phenomena.
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